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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between playing success and
commercial success in team sports. Utilizing a data set relating to the
English Premier League that combines both financial measures and
indicators of playing skills and performances, our empirical analysis
is based on three behavioural equations. Our analysis indicates that
on-field success can be directly related to players’ skills and abilities
and that revenue is positively related to on-field success. Wage
expenditure is also shown to systematically reflect player skills and
performances. One interpretation of this evidence is that investment
in players’ skills and ability buys on-field success, with richer teams
becoming ever richer and able to maintain or even build upon success
by spending more on players than less successful clubs. To the extent
that richer clubs are successful in their objective there is a causal link
between revenue earned and competitive imbalance via investments
in players. The implications of this tendency within a league are
discussed in our conclusion, which also considers the potentially
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wider implications of our study as they relate to the evolution of firm
size and issues of market share.
Keywords: competitive balance, hedonic wages, human capital in-
vestment, production functions, team sports
JEL classification codes: D2, J3, J4, L1, L2
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper combines two research strands in the economics of sport, and
more specifically the analysis of association football, in order to inves-
tigate the relationship between playing success and commercial success
in sporting enterprises. It also examines the possibility of feedback
effects from playing success to competitive balance in sporting leagues
via the investments of clubs in human capital, i.e., their players. These
relationships are explored in the specific context of English Premier
League (PL) football, employing an empirical model based on three
behavioural equations, with the results appearing consistent with the
persistence over time of inequalities between clubs in terms of their
playing success and wealth. The ensuing interpretation of how clubs can
maintain their place, or enhance their performance, within a league can
also lead to insights about how firms maintain or increase their market
share.
The next section provides a summary of relevant previous research
in the area. This is followed by a description of the study context.
We then describe our data set and present the behavioural equations
that underly our empirical model. The penultimate section contains
an analysis of the results of the estimation procedure. Our concluding
section provides a summary and discusses the wider implications of the
analysis.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Following Scully’s (1974) seminal work there has been a persistent
tradition of production function analysis in the economics of sportswhere
teams, like other enterprises, are assumed to be involved in a production
process with ‘output’, in terms of sporting success, arising from the
combination of a range of various player and non-player inputs. One
strand of empirical research explores the relationships between playing
performance and playing success, either in terms of seasonal/tournament
outcomes or match results (e.g., most recently, Hofler and Payne, 1998;
Carmichael et al., 2000, 2001; Espitier-Escuer and Garcia-Cebrian,
2004; Barros and Leach, 2006a, b; Gerrard, 2006; Hofler and Payne,
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2006),1 where output is traditionally measured by such indicators as
league position, win rates, points achieved or, in association football,
goals or goal difference. Teams’ playing performances are measured
by indicators of players’ skills and abilities (relative to opponents),
together with other characteristics, such as age and experience, and
non-playing inputs have traditionally included aspects such as squad
size and managerial skills. Those studies that have explicitly focused
on the physical linkage relationships between measures of playing skills
and performance and success on the field of play have modelled the
contribution of different player skills and abilities by relating output to
a range of different aspects of match play performance. In association
football these have included measures of attacking or constructive play
(e.g., goals, shots), other constructive play (e.g. passes completed), less
constructive play (e.g., dribbles, passes not completed), aggressive play
(e.g., tackles) and defensive play (e.g., saves). In addition, those non
playing inputs that have been employed include attempts to quantify the
influences of home advantage (e.g., Carmichael and Thomas, 2005),
managerial/coaching contributions2 and team fixed effects, with ac-
knowledgement also made to the chance/stochastic element involved
in determining individual match results.
The second strand of empirical research in this area involves a related
literature that has explored the relationship between wage/salary expen-
diture and sporting success (the win–wage relationship) in an effort to
identify a causal link between club revenue disparities, and/or within-
team payroll/salary inequalities, and team productivity and performance
(e.g., Szymanski and Smith, 1997; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Hall
et al., 2002; DeBrock et al., 2004; Dobson and Goddard, 2004; Forrest
and Simmons, 2004; Jewell and Molina, 2004). This literature also ties
into the competitive balance debate by relating wages and revenue
to success. While the evidence is somewhat variable the results of
applied research in this area generally indicates a positive relationship
between playing success and both wage expenditure and revenue. These
relationships have been taken to imply that there is potentially a causal
link via wage expenditure from revenue inequality to competitive imbal-
ance between teams in a league. However, the underlying relationship
1 Scully’s (1974) model was subjected to various re-specifications and re-estimations,
focusing almost entirely on US sports, and Scully (1989) himself updated his original model.
See Scully (1995), Downward and Dawson (2000) and Dobson and Goddard (2001, with
particular regard to association football) for detailed surveys of production function studies,
together with Borland (2006).
2 Team management and coaching/support staff can directly affect the outcome of indi-
vidual matches, and eventual seasonal outcomes, through decisions regarding team selection
and tactics, within-game substitutions, purchase and sale of players to reconstitute squads,
as well as developing teamwork, cohesiveness and morale. Studies incorporating managerial
input and efficiency aspects include Porter and Scully (1982), Kahn (1993a), Fizel and D’Itri
(1997), Kahane (2005), Hofler and Payne (2006) for US sports, with Dawson et al. (2000a, b)
and Dawson and Dobson (2002) specifically treating association football.
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between playing performance and wages which presumably underlies
the relationship between wages and success has not been explored in
this literature mainly due to data limitations. At the same time, links
between playing success and financial measures (such as wage costs and
revenue) have not been developed in the production function literature
(although some studies have estimated cost functions andGerrard (2006)
examines links between the win–wage relationship and a vector of player
characteristics such as age and experience).
Informed and motivated by previous work this paper attempts to
develop, and explicitly bridge the gaps between, the two strands of
research by utilizing a data set that contains both financial measures
and indicators of playing skills and performances. The empirical model
specifies a production function, a revenue function, and a hedonic wage–
price function. We then test the hypothesis that wages impact directly
on league success by estimating a production function that includes as
independent variables the predicted wage from the hedonic wage esti-
mation and a direct measure of wage expenditure. The analysis indicates
that, in line with standard theoretical relationships, output in the English
PL (measured by league success) depends on the quantity and quality
of playing inputs (i.e., the human capital invested in players). Revenue
shares are, in turn, positively related to higher output, investments in
human capital (players) are related positively to increases in revenue,
and wages are systematically linked to playing skills and performances.
In addition, premium wages paid over and above average payments
for playing skills and performance appear to be positively linked to
success in the league. These linkages are consistent with a causal link
between playing success and the maintenance of competitive imbalance
via higher revenue, increases in wage expenditure and, consequently,
increased availability of playing talent. However, such linkages do not
necessarily imply that sustained success by one or more clubs over a
number of seasons will lead to increased imbalance. This will depend
on the parameters of the model which are explored.
III. THE ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE
The English PL, also known as the Premiership, forms the top tier of
England’s professional football structure. It was established in 1992 to
replace the First Division of the then four division English Football
League (FL), and is regulated by the Football Association (FA) and run
separately from the remaining three divisions comprising the FL. The
PL and the top division of the FL are linked by the traditional system
of end of season promotion and relegation, whereby the bottom three
PL clubs are demoted and replaced by three FL clubs. End of season
PL positions are determined by accumulated match points over regular
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
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season fixtures (3 for a win, 1 for a draw, and 0 for a loss), with teams
equal on total points ranked by aggregate goal difference.While the team
topping the PL is crowned ‘champion’ and qualifies for the following
season’s European UEFA Champions League competition, a number of
other highly placed clubs also qualify for European competitions, along
with the winners of two domestic knock-out cup tournaments played
alongside PL fixtures.3
Although all PL clubs theoretically compete on an equal footing, their
aspiration levels and performance capability (not necessarily matched)
are variable, depending on financial strength, support base and, in many
cases, footballing history. While a small group of clubs are perennial
contenders for championship honours and qualification for lucrative
European competition, some are fringe candidates for the latter with the
majority viewing continuing PL survival as their priority, at least in the
short term. Avoidance of relegation, and its potentially dire financial
consequences, is a critical consideration, and the end-of-season ‘sub-
competition’ between threatened clubs is commonly as intense and high
profile as that involving the leading clubs at the top end of the league
table.
During the study period, covering the seasons 1998–1999 to 2004–
2005, the English PL comprised 20 clubs, playing each other on a home
and away basis, whose composition varied from season to season due
to the system of promotion and relegation (usually involving some, if
not all, of the three most recently promoted clubs). Thirty-three clubs
competed in the PL at some stage during the study period, with ten
displaying permanency and a number of others reappearing (at least
once) following demotion. Twelve teams achieved a top six position
at least once, with the three teams that featured in all seven seasons
also sharing the championship honours (Arsenal twice, Chelsea once,
and Manchester United four times), and one other club (Liverpool)
appearing in the top six on all but one occasion.4 In addition to a
few ownership changes and, more commonly, managerial turnover (see
Bridgewater, 2005) team composition underwent regular and oftenmajor
restructuring, as players left and joined clubs, having usually been sold
3 See, for example, Goddard (2006) and Szymanski (2006a) for a fuller treatment of asso-
ciation football in England and the economics of association football (soccer) respectively.
4 This indication of competitive imbalance in English association football has been
explicitly investigated by Michie and Oughton (2004). Employing a range of indicators, their
study of English football over the period 1947–2004 shows that, while competitive balance
in the top division remained roughly consistent between 1947 and 1987, there has been a
significant decline since then particularly indicating a growing inequality between the top
five clubs and the rest. See also Szymanski and Smith’s (1997) pre-Premiership investigation
of English association football, Dobson and Goddard’s (1998) historical investigation of
performance, revenue and cross-subsidization in the English FL, and Dobson et al.’s (2001)
study of revenue convergence in the English FL. Michie and Oughton (2004) also identify
similar trends in competitive balance experienced by two other top-flight European leagues
in Germany and Italy, and to a lesser extent in France and Spain.
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
6 BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
or bought in the transfer market (see Carmichael (2006) and Frick (2007)
for an examination of the transfer system and professional footballers’
labour market). Another notable, if obvious, feature of the PL is that,
like other sporting sectors, it is highly labour intensive. This is evident
from the relatively high ratio of wage expenditure to revenue earned.
For example, figures from Deloitte (2006, p. 16) indicate that wages as
a percentage of turnover in the PL rose from 47 percent in the 1995–96
season to 59 percent in the 2004–5 season (after reaching a peak of 62
percent during the 1999–2000 and 2001–02 seasons).
IV. DATA SET AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
The data used in our analysis of the PL originates from three main
sources. The financial data on wage expenditure, club revenue and
transfer spending is derived from Deloitte (annually 2000–2007). The
data relating to playing performance and league success in the PL is
obtained from two sources. Data for the 1998–9 to 2001–2 seasons was
obtained from OPTA (1999–2002) while Actim data for the 2002–3
to 2004–5 seasons was accessed through PA Sports (2007). Playing
performance data comprise match play statistics, in terms of goals,
shots, saves, tackles, passes, etc. Club success data relate to end of
season league positions, and points totals, while other variables cover
management input/change, the home-field effect and participation in
other competitions.
The empirical model consists of three behavioural equations:
Sit = S(Pit , Mit , Iit ) (1)
Rit = R(Sit , Sit−1, Mit , Iit ) (2)
Wit = W (Pit , Mit , Iit ) (3)
where the subscript t indicates the tth season (t = 1998–1999, 2004–
2005) and subscript i indicates the ith club (i = 1, 33). Rit is the ith
club’s share of revenue earned within the league in the tth season and
Sit a measure of the ith club’s share of league success in t. Sit−1 is a
measure of the ith club’s share of league success in t – 1, Wit measures
relative wage expenditure by the ith club (as a percentage share of total
Premiership expenditure in t),Mit is a vector of managerial inputs, Pit is
a vector of playing inputs reflecting playing skills and talent, and Iit is a
vector of other inputs. Definitions of all variables and summary statistics
are presented in Table 1 and the Appendix.
The vector ofmanagerial inputs includes twomeasures: tenure in years
at the current club at the start of the season (MANYRS) and whether
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there was a managerial change in the current season (CHMAN).5 The
vector of playing performance variables includes measures of a range
of skills and abilities common to both the OPTA and Actim data. These
capture various aspects of attacking play, other constructive play, less
constructive play, aggressive play and defensive play (as detailed in
Table 1 and the Appendix). The vector of other inputs includes a measure
of reliance on home advantage, as the season ratio of points won at home
to points won away (HOME). Additionally, dummy variables indicating
participation in European competitions are included in the estimation of
Equations (2) and (3).
Equation (1) is a sports’ production function in which a club’s output
is measured by success in the league, Sit, and depends on playing
inputs, Pit (performances on the field), and non-playing inputs such
as the managerial contribution and the strength of home support. Sit
may be measured in a number of ways as noted earlier. However, since
we are particularly interested in implications for competitive balance,
we measure success in terms of the ith club’s percentage share of the
total points achieved by all clubs during the season, POINTSH%. The
distribution of this measure of league success has been used in previous
research to provide an indication of the degree of competitive balance
since it is, in effect, the ith club’s (market) share of total output in the
league (Michie and Oughton, 2004).6 An alternative measure of success
is the ith club’s percentage share of the total points attainable by all
clubs in any season, PNTS%MAX, and for comparison we also estimate
Equation (1) with this alternative dependent variable.
Equation (2) is a standard revenue equation in which revenue is a
function of output and managerial specific inputs. In this case, club
shares in total Premiership revenue, REVSH%, are estimated as a
function of the share of total output measured by playing success in
the current and previous seasons (POINTSH%, PREVPNTSH% and
PROM), where PREVPNTSH% measures a club’s share of points in the
previous season and PROM indicates whether a club was promoted to
the PL at the end of the previous season. Club revenue in the tth season
is derived mainly frommatch day attendance, membership packages, the
sale of broadcasting rights and sponsorship deals,7 and at least the first
two of these depend to a large extent on a club’s recent success as well as
historical, club-specific factors. For example, Szymanski and Kuypers
5 See Audas et al.’s (1999, 2002) studies of managerial change in English association
football.
6 Michie and Oughton (2004) apply the C5 concentration ratio to the analysis of association
football (total points won by the top five clubs divided by the total number of points won by
all clubs) as an application of the standard industry measure.
7 Data from Deloitte (2007) indicates that, in 2005–6, 33 percent of revenue in the PL
was derived from match day attendance, 42 percent from broadcasting and 25 percent from
sponsorship.
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(1999) found a strong, positive correlation between the revenue of 40
English football clubs and their league position between 1978 and 1997.
In addition, while match day attendance is linked to league performance,
broadcasting revenue from television rights is distributed in the current
season partly on the basis of league performance in the previous season
(so-called merit payments). Forrest et al. (2006) have also found that
both broadcaster and audience demand for televised matches is related
to the league success of teams in the previous season. Furthermore,
Deloitte (2006) identify on-field performance as the ‘key revenue driver’
for clubs because it eventually provides access to lucrative European
competitions. This consideration highlights the ‘multi-product’ com-
mitment of the top clubs which (following Gerrard, 2006) is controlled
for by including dummy variables indicating participation in the UEFA
Champions League (CHAMPIONSL) and the UEFACup (UEFACUP).8
Equation (3) is a hedonic wage–price or earnings function that relates
players’ skills and performances to wage expenditure measured as a
share of total Premiership wages in each season (WAGESH%).9 This
specification implies that the value of players to clubs depends ultimately
on their playing performance which, in turn, is determined by their
skills and ability (their human capital) as well as the contribution of the
manager and complementary inputs.
Whereas (1)–(3) together constitute a recursive system of equations
that can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) (Kmenta, 1997,
pp. 719–720), Equation (3) implies that wage expenditure is an indirect
determinant of success (because wage expenditure purchases human
capital). Thus playing success, and by implication revenue, depend on
wage expenditure (as is suggested by previous research on the win–
wage relationship). However, wage expenditure will also depend to some
extent on the availability of finance and the latter is determined at least in
part by a club’s revenuewhich is linked to success (as implied in Equation
(2)). This suggests that there is potential simultaneity in the win–wage
relationship (as also discussed in Gerrard, 2006) because random shocks
that affect success and revenue probably also affect wage expenditure.10
8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we take account of the impact
on wage costs and revenue of participation by the top clubs in pan-European competitions.
9 In the absence of data on players’ wages, transfer fees have been used in previous research
to estimate hedonic earnings equations for individual players. As with earnings, transfer fees,
where payable, should be determined by the (expected) playing performances of individual
players. However, since the Bosman ruling, many players are transferred without a fee and
when transfer fees are paid they are paid to the selling club rather than to the transferred
player (see, for example, Antonioni and Cubbin, 2000; Ericson, 2000; Kesenne, 2006). The
determination of transfer fees is therefore potentially more complex than that of wages since
the former depends on the outcome of a transaction involving at least three participants –
the buying club, the selling club and the player – as well as the players’ agent (see, for
example, Carmichael, 2006; Frick, 2007).
10 In addition, standard cost theory implies that total wage costs and output are jointly
determined (particularly when there is limited scope for substitution between inputs).
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This is investigated by using the instrumented variable (IV) estimator
to re-estimate Equation (1) treating wage expenditure as an endogenous
regressor:
Sit = S(Xit ,Wit ) (1.1)
where Wit is instrumented by independent variables found to be signif-
icant in Equation (3), and Xit is a vector of exogenous performance,
managerial and other inputs. The influence of wage expenditure on
league success is further explored by additionally weightingWAGESH%
by the inefficiency term from a stochastic wage–cost frontier estimation
of Equation (3). A larger and more significant effect of the weighted
variable compared with that of WAGESH% would imply that wage
expenditure over and above that of the estimated relationship between
wages and playing skills and performances exerted a direct effect on
performance. Such an effect would be consistent with a number of
explanations, including playing skills and performances not captured in
the hedonic wage estimation (such as superstar effects; see, for example,
Lucifora and Simmons, 2003), efficiency wages or other, perhaps club-
specific, high-wage strategies (DeBrock et al., 2004).
Table 1 presents some summary statistics and definitions relating
to the playing performance and financial variables in the data set,
and also reports correlation coefficients between league points and the
other variables. The data indicate that current season league success
is positively correlated with previous performances (measured by the
previous season’s points and entry into the UEFA Champions League),
revenue and wage costs as well as all the variables measuring attacking
play, and with two of the variables measuring constructive play and
managerial tenure. League success is not significantly correlated with
measures of aggressive play but is negatively related to two defensive
measures, a change of manager, reliance on home advantage, net transfer
fees and whether a team has been newly promoted.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of our estimations of the production,
revenue and hedonic wage equations (1)–(3). Initially, we report OLS
estimations for each of the specifications. In addition, we estimated both
panel data random and fixed effects models to examine the significance
However, the inclusion of the current season’s wage expenditure in the production function
is less problematic if wage contracts (like transfer fees) reflect only expectations (based on
performances in previous seasons or with different clubs) rather than the actual contributions
of individual players to current performance and revenue generation. Also, it seems unlikely
that wage expenditures are completely unrelated to current performances (e.g. through
performance related bonuses) even if previous performances are also relevant.
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
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of individual club effects. Because the random effects model is more
efficient than the fixed effects model, the results from fitting the former
are reported where the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test
indicated that the individual effects were significant and a Hausman test
indicated that the model was consistent (Baum, 2006, pp. 220–231). The
alternative fixed effects model is presented if a Hausman test indicated
that the random effects model was not consistent and an F-test indicated
that there were significant individual effects, implying that pooled OLS
was inappropriate. In order to consider efficiency issues in relation to
production and wage costs, we additionally fitted the stochastic frontier
model to the production and wage functions (Equations (1) and (3)).
V.1 Production
Table 2 shows the results from estimating a production function for
the PL with output measured by the natural log of POINTSH% (and
for comparison LnPNTS%MAX) and inputs chosen to reflect a range
of playing skills and performances. Among the independent variables
we do not include any direct measures of goals scored or conceded
even though goals are the only measures of playing performance that
contribute directly to winning or losing in association football. While
this means that the relationship between league points and goals is very
strong (goal difference explains a little over 80 percent of the variation
in league points) it is predictable, and the underlying performances
that lead to the creation or concession of a goal are intrinsically more
interesting. In essence, success depends on goals scored and conceded
but goals themselves depend on other aspects of playing performance
(Carmichael et al., 2001). We therefore experimented with a number of
playing performance measures that were common to both data sources.
However, the influences of some of the measures were not significant in
a multivariate context.
From among those variables that were significant in various combina-
tions we selected a number to reflect a range of performances and skills
that included attacking play, other constructive play, aggressive play,
defensive ability, managerial inputs and home advantage, and a process
involving the elimination of the least significant variables led to the
specification presented in Table 2. For example, we initially included a
number of raw quantitative measures of playing performance such as the
total number of shots taken (those on target aswell as those off target), the
number of crosses made, the number of dribbles and runs, the number of
yellow and red cards received (for a variety of infringements/disciplinary
offences), the number of fouls committed, and the number of tackles
made. However, more qualitative measures (when available) generally
proved to be more successful than these raw measures. These included
the following variables (for full definitions see the Appendix): a measure
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
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of the constructiveness or efficiency of overall attacking play (the ratio of
goals, assists and accurate shots to total shots; CONATTACK/SHOTS);
a measure providing an indication of the quantity of effective attacking
play (total shots on target; SHOTSTAR); three measures chosen to
provide some indication of a team’s ability to retain possession of the
ball (the number of passes, crosses, and dribbles and runs actually
completed; PSCOMP, CROSSCOMP and DRBRUNCOMP); and one
(negative) measure of the quality of a team’s defensive skills (the ratio of
goals conceded to goalkeeper saves; GLCON/SAVES). Because a good
defence should be able to reduce the effectiveness of the opposition’s
attack, and make a goalkeeper’s task of saving shots at goal easier and/or
more effective, fewer goals should be conceded. Therefore a negative
sign on GLCON/SAVES is expected.
The results in Table 2 show that these constructed measures of
performance take predictable signs in the estimations, and their greater
significance compared with the equivalent raw measures appears to con-
firm the seemingly commonsense prediction that the quality of play or
possession is a more influential determinant of success than the quantity
of possession. Unfortunately, no completion data were systematically
available for blocks, clearances or interceptions and therefore only the
raw numerical measure (BLKCLRINT) could be included, taking a
negative sign. Other measures relating to more aggressive play such
as fouls committed and tackles, and red or yellow cards awarded, were
never significant and are not included in the estimations presented. This
lack of significance could be because the influence of aggressive play,
such as tackles and interceptions, is difficult to predict a priori since it
is not obvious whether such play is an indication of positive attacking
play or more desperate play resulting from lack of possession. In fact,
the negative influence of BLKCLRINT suggests that the latter is more
likely to be the case. Of the two measures of managerial experience only
the influence of CHMANwas ever significant. It takes a negative sign in
the regressions,11 as does the measure of a team’s reliance on their home
advantage, which would indicate the limitations of an over-reliance on
the home-field effect and the need for more balanced home and away
performance.
The results presented are full log estimates of the exponential, Cobb–
Douglas production function since specification tests suggested that
the loglinear estimation was marginally better specified than the linear
11 The negative influence of a managerial change is consistent with a negative impact of
transition. However, managerial change is also potentially endogenous to these estimations
(we are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point). Changes often occur
when a team performs poorly, although movements of managers within the PL indicate that
managerial changes can also take place when a team is performing relatively well. With the
inclusion of the managerial change variable in the estimations, the signs and influences of
the other variables in the estimation were not significantly affected and since the managerial
role is deemed to be relevant we report the results with this variable included.
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estimation.12 All the included variables are significant at the 10 percent
level or higher and the logged formulation also provides a useful estimate
of the overall returns to scale; the sum of the continuous coefficients
is less than one (0.695) indicating diminishing returns overall although
constant returns to scale could not be ruled out on the basis of aWald test.
The R2 statistic suggests that around 62 percent of the variation in league
performance is explained by the measures included in the regression.
A comparison of estimations 1(a) and 1(b) shows that there is little
difference in these results when the dependent variable is PNTS%MAX
compared with POINTSH%. Therefore, for consistency with the relative
revenue and wage measures and the seasonal market share interpretation
of POINTSH%, the latter is used in subsequent estimations.13
Estimation 1(c) takes into account the panel nature of the data by
estimating a random effects model.14 We also used the fixed effects
model to fit the equation but an F-test showed that the individual fixed
effects were not significant. Because a Hausman test indicated that the
random effects model was efficient only these results are presented. In
this estimation all the included variables are significant at the 5 percent
level or higher. The sum of the coefficients is also less (0.583) but
constant returns are only rejected at the 10 percent level of significance.
The lack of evidence for increasing returns to playing performance
implies that improvements in performance only result in proportionate
(or less than proportionate) increases in a club’s share of league points.
This suggests that competitive balance is not disproportionately threat-
ened by improvements in the quality of play of more successful teams.
Nevertheless one team’s increase in the share of points must imply, by
definition, a decrease in the share of another.
Estimation 1(d) is a stochastic frontier estimation of the Cobb–
Douglas production function that incorporates the panel-specific effect
in the random inefficiency term. In this estimation the inefficiency terms
are significant at the 1 percent level and they can be used to rank the clubs
on the basis of the efficiency of their performance over the seven study
seasons (see Table 5 later). The estimates indicate that, of the 33 clubs,
Everton and Chelsea were the most efficient at manufacturing points
from playing performance. The least efficient teams were Manchester
12 RESET and Link function tests failed to reject both specifications (as well as a semi-log
estimation) at the 5 percent level of significance. However, the RESET test of the linear
form rejected the assumption that the model was correctly specified at the 10 percent level
of significance.
13 However, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, using the POINTSH%variable means
that the measure of success will vary between seasons even if a club has exactly the same
number of points but other teams have a different number of draws.
14 We additionally estimated an OLS estimation including dummy variables (OLSDV) for
32 of the 33 clubs (equivalent to the fixed effects model). None of the club dummy variables
were significant in the OLSDV estimation and a RESET test indicated that the model was
not correctly specified.
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City and Crystal Palace, who presumably squandered more of their
playing possession.
V.2 Revenue
Estimations 2(a) and 2(b) in Table 3 show the results of estimating a
loglinear formulation of Equation (2). Clubs’ share of total revenue is
regressed on clubs’ share of output in the current and preceding seasons,
and the influences of both are shown to be positive and significant.
PROM and LnMANYRS are also included in these estimations. The
former is an alternative measure of success in the previous season and
appears to have a positive impact on revenue shares, while the latter is
included to capture the possible impact on club earnings of managerial
experience although LnMANYRS is found to be insignificant and takes
a negative sign. The coefficients of the continuous variables in the
estimation sum to 1.893 and the assumption of constant returns to
success is rejected in favour of increasing returns at the 5 percent level
of significance. In estimation 2(b) the dummy variables controlling for
participation in European competitions are included but only partici-
pation in the UEFA Champions League appears to have a significant
effect on revenue shares. That the inclusion of CHAMPIONSL reduces
the influence of a club’s share of points in the preceding season is not
altogether surprising since entry into the lucrative European competi-
tions is dependent on previous league success. The reduced influence of
promotion in the previous season is perhaps more interesting suggesting
that, when the prior performance of the most successful clubs is allowed
for, the relative impact of promotion is weaker.
Estimations 2(c) and 2(d) allow for club-specific fixed effects. These
capture historical fixed effects associated with the core support and
relative success and failure of individual Premiership clubs. The fixed
effects are significant and a Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects
model is preferred to the random effects model. Specification tests
also indicated that, after allowing for club-specific fixed effects, the
estimations were correctly specified.15
In estimation 2(c) the inclusion of fixed effects reduces the influence
of current success and, as in estimation 2(b)with the inclusion of CHAM-
PIONSL and UEFACUP, the influence of previous season success and
promotion is also reduced, although both measures remain significant
at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. This can be taken to
imply that the club fixed effects capture sources of club revenue related
to previous success (as do the European competition dummy variables).
15 When club fixed effects were not included RESET and Link tests suggested that both
the logged and linear formulations were incorrectly specified while the inclusion of fixed
effects indicated that both were correctly specified. However, since a Wald test rules out
constant returns to league success, the log version is preferred.
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This interpretation is supported by the lack of significance of themeasure
of previous season’s success and promotion in estimation 2(d) which
includes the European competition dummy variables as well as the club
fixed effects (although the influence of UEFACUP is not significant and
the coefficient on CHAMPIONSL is reduced compared with estimation
2(b)). With the inclusion of the club-specific fixed effects in estimation
2(c) the sum of the coefficients of the continuous variables is only
0.727 and the assumption of constant returns is rejected in favour of
diminishing returns at the 5 percent level of significance. In estimation
2(d) the sum of the coefficients of the continuous variables and the
European competition variables is still less than one (0.833) but the
assumption of constant returns cannot be rejected by a Wald test.
The results suggest that after allowing for club effects and success in
the preceding season the financial returns to success in the PL accumu-
late at a constant or diminishing rate. Since increasing returns to success
are not implied by these results, this would appear to have positive impli-
cations for competitive balance. On the other hand, however, the evidence
that club-specific effects impact on revenue shares independently of
league success is likely to have negative implications for competitive
balance. The significance of participation in the UEFA Champions
League is also consistent with this interpretation, since in every season
in the data set Arsenal and Manchester United and (except during 2000–
01) either or both of Chelsea or Liverpool were also playing in that
tournament. This suggests that some clubs have access to resources that
are a source of sustained advantage in terms of their revenue earning
ability (Barney, 1991). In the case of football clubs, these are most likely
to have arisen from their individual and unique club histories, which
will have endowed some clubs with more valuable resources than others.
In estimations 2(c) and 2(d) the positively significant club fixed effects
are those of Arsenal, Aston Villa, Chelsea, Leeds United, Liverpool,
Manchester City, Manchester United, Newcastle United, Sunderland,
Tottenham Hotspur and West Ham United. Even after allowing for their
current season league performance and including any participation in
the Champions League, these clubs earned significantly more than the
other clubs in the sample throughout the period under investigation.
Inasmuch as there is a causal link from revenue to league success via
investments in players, this would appear to have adverse implications
for competitive balance since it implies that some sources of revenue are
unequally distributed and independent of league success.
Overall, the results indicate that there is a strong, significant rela-
tionship between revenue shares and current as well previous playing
success (measured by clubs’ shares in total points, success in achieving
promotion and participation in European competitions). Nevertheless,
the significance of the club-specific fixed effects implies that other
sources of revenue are also important.
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V.3 Hedonic wages
Within the sample of PL clubs, 65 percent of revenue was spent on wages
over the study period. Whether this expenditure reflected an accurate
assessment of the value of the available playing talent was examined by
estimating a hedonic wage–price function, or an earnings equation, for
the PL. In the estimations reported in Table 4 the independent variables
included to reflect players’ skills and abilities are the same as those
in the production function estimates presented in Table 2 with two
exceptions. First, LnMANYRS is included rather than CHMAN because
the influence of the latter was not significant in these estimations.
Second, the European competition variables are included in estimation
3(b). Inasmuch as the independent variables are significant then this can
be interpreted as evidence that wages are an efficient payment for playing
talent (as previous research indicates). This would have implications
for competitive balance, since it would suggest that there is a positive
link between wage expenditure and playing performance and ultimately
financial success. Such a link is a necessary condition for the existence
of virtuous (and vicious) circles in the English PL (Michie and Oughton,
2004) since these imply feedback effects via wage expenditure from
playing and financial success (and failure) to future performances.
The R2 statistic for estimation 3(a) indicates that measurable skills,
a club’s reliance on home advantage and managerial tenure explain
57 percent of the variation in wage costs. This result suggests that
players are systematically rewarded for their skills and performance.
In particular, clubs are willing to pay a premium for attacking skills
(specifically constructive attacking possession including the ability to
shoot on target). They also reward skills related to the ability to maintain
possession of the ball and potentially create attacks (passing ability).
In contrast, inefficient defensive play (conceding goals) is associated
with a wage penalty implying that good defensive abilities attract a
positive premium. Potentially less constructive, aggressive play, reflected
in this estimation by blocks, clearances and interceptions, may be more
difficult to value and this measure is not significantly related to wage
expenditure. An over-reliance on home advantage is negatively related
to wage expenditure as is club-specific managerial experience.
The sum of the continuous coefficients in specification 3(a) is 1.093
suggesting that wage costs rise a little more than proportionately in
relation to players’ skills and abilities. This would be consistent with a
small ‘superstar’ wage effect since it would imply that very highly skilled
players receive disproportionately higher wages (although constant costs
were not rejected by a Wald test). Because clubs with more ‘superstar’
players are more likely to be involved in the European competitions this
possibility is explored by including the dummy variables UEFACUP and
CHAMPIONSL in estimation 3(b). In this estimation, participation in
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
20 BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
TA
B
L
E
4
W
ag
e
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
3(
a)
3(
b)
3(
c)
(O
L
S)
(O
L
S)
(S
to
ch
as
ti
c
fr
on
ti
er
)
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
C
oe
ff.
s.
e.
C
oe
ff.
s.
e.
C
oe
ff.
s.
e.
L
nC
O
N
A
T
TA
C
K
/S
H
O
T
S
0.
36
1∗
∗
0.
17
0.
07
5
0.
16
0.
07
5
0.
15
3
L
nS
H
O
T
S
TA
R
0.
70
4∗
∗∗
0.
16
5
0.
35
1∗
∗
0.
15
9
0.
35
1∗
∗
0.
15
2
L
nC
R
O
S
S
C
O
M
P
0.
19
2∗
∗
0.
08
3
0.
14
∗
0.
07
3
0.
14
∗∗
0.
07
L
nP
S
C
O
M
P
0.
74
9∗
∗∗
0.
16
2
0.
61
7∗
∗∗
0.
14
7
0.
61
7∗
∗∗
0.
14
1
L
nD
R
B
R
U
N
C
O
M
P
0.
09
6∗
0.
05
5
0.
04
3
0.
05
0.
04
3
0.
04
8
L
nG
L
C
O
N
/S
A
V
E
S
−0
.3
3∗
∗∗
0.
09
1
−0
.2
51
∗∗
∗
0.
08
3
−0
.2
51
∗∗
∗
0.
08
L
nB
L
K
C
L
R
IN
T
−0
.1
77
0.
16
2
0.
01
9
0.
15
−0
.0
19
0.
14
L
nH
O
M
E
−0
.1
67
∗∗
0.
07
−0
.1
36
∗∗
0.
06
3
−0
.1
36
∗∗
0.
06
L
nM
A
N
Y
R
S
−0
.0
25
∗∗
0.
01
1
−0
.0
22
∗∗
0.
01
−0
.0
2∗
∗
0.
00
9
C
H
A
M
P
IO
N
S
0.
48
8∗
∗∗
0.
08
8
0.
22
1∗
∗∗
0.
05
7
U
E
FA
0.
22
1∗
∗∗
0.
06
0.
48
8∗
∗∗
0.
08
4
C
O
N
S
TA
N
T
−9
.4
52
∗∗
∗
2.
30
−7
.4
51
∗∗
∗
2.
09
2
−7
.4
5
5.
19
8
R
2
ad
j;
R
2
ov
er
al
lf
or
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
m
od
el
0.
57
0.
65
6
F
21
.4
9∗
∗∗
25
.0
5∗
∗∗
W
al
d
χ
2
30
1.
35
∗∗
∗
L
og
-l
ik
el
ih
oo
d
−0
.7
43
6
N
o.
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
14
0
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
L
nW
A
G
E
S
H
%
.
∗∗
∗ ,
∗∗
,∗
,s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
ly
si
gn
if
ic
an
ta
t1
%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
MAINTAINING MARKET POSITION IN THE PREMIER LEAGUE 21
both European competitions exerts a significant and positive influences
on wage expenditure and the influences of some of the playing per-
formance variables are correspondingly reduced. With the inclusion of
the European competition variables in estimation 3(b), around 9 percent
more of the variation in wage expenditure is explained and the sum
of the continuous coefficients is reduced to 0.836. This suggests that,
after allowing for European participation, wage costs rise, if anything,
less than proportionately to playing skills and performances (although
constant returns were not ruled out). This result is consistent with a
significant proportion of the wage bill of the most successful clubs
being a reward for player performances in competitions external to the
English PL.
Table 4 does not present the results from either the fixed or random
effects estimations. Tests indicated that the former were not significant
and those of the random effects model not consistent, implying that
pooled OLS was appropriate. However, estimation 3(c) shows the results
from the stochastic frontier estimation of the hedonic wage function.
The ui inefficiency terms from this estimation were used to construct the
inefficiency (high wage) rankings in Table 5. Higher ui are indicative
of a club pursuing a high or premium wage strategy that involves clubs
incurring higher than minimum costs for playing talent, and in this
sense only are they ‘inefficient’. The highest and, arguably, the most
‘inefficient’ payers were Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester United and
Arsenal. Among these four teams only Arsenal and Chelsea were also
among the six most efficient clubs at converting playing performances
into league success (column 3).
V.4 Success and wage strategies
As has been noted, previous research has found a strong, positive corre-
lation between success and wage expenditure. Szymanski and Kuypers
(1999) and Hall et al. (2002) find very strong positive relationships
between league position in English football and wage expenditure.
These results have been interpreted as implying that clubs have good
information about the talent of individual players and pay wages that
reflect their productivity with reasonable accuracy, i.e., they get what
they pay for. This is confirmed to some extent by the hedonic wage
estimations. To examine the links between wage expenditure and playing
performance explicitly we re-estimated Equation (1) as Equation (1.1).
The re-estimations reported in specifications 1.1(a) and 1.1(b) of Table 6
are estimated using the IV estimator with wage expenditure treated as
endogenous and instrumented by the independent variables significant
in estimation 3(b). To satisfy the order condition CHMAN and LnBLK-
CLRINT, which were not significant in 3(a) but are significant in the
production function estimations in Table 2, are included as exogenous
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
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variables in these estimations. Sargan and Basmann tests for overidenti-
fying restrictions in estimation 1.1(a) accepted the null hypothesis that
the instruments were uncorrelated with the error term (Baum, 2006,
pp. 193–194). Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests of endogeneity confirmed
that it was appropriate to treat wage expenditure as an endogenous
variable in the model (Baum, 2006, pp. 211–214).
Wage expenditure is significant in estimation 1.1(a), with the coeffi-
cient on LnWAGESH% being 0.617. However, constant returns overall
are rejected by the Wald test at the 1 percent level of significance, a
significant result in that it suggests that the returns towage expenditure in
terms of the share of league points won are diminishing, and considerable
increases in wage expenditure might therefore be needed to achieve a
moderate improvement in league success. The R2 statistic of 0.5598 is
slightly lower than that for the production function estimations in Table
2, suggesting that wage expenditure conveys considerable information
about unmeasured skills and abilities of players. Additionally, wage
expenditure may also reflect other influences on performance. For
example, because we do not have data on the number of playing and
non-playing staff, wage expenditure will also capture the influence of
squad size and the contribution of non-playing staff. Interestingly, with
the inclusion of club-specific fixed effects in estimation 1.1(b), wage
expenditure retains significance but the F-test indicates that the club
effects themselves are not significant. This suggests that the relationship
between wage expenditure and success could be, in part, a club-specific
one.16
To further explore the relationship between wage expenditure and
playing successwe include an alternativemeasure ofwage expenditure in
the IV specification 1.1(c). The variable LnWAGESH% ∗ INEFF is equal
to LnWAGESH% multiplied by the inefficiency term, ui, derived from
the stochastic cost frontier estimation of the hedonic wage function (esti-
mation 3(c) in Table 4).Multiplyingwage expenditure by the inefficiency
term weights ‘inefficient’ spenders more highly. The somewhat greater
significance of the instrumented multiplicative variable in estimation
1.1(c) and the higher R2 indicates that clubs pursuing an ‘inefficient’
high wage policy are more successful, with one interpretation being that
their higher wage costs are not an indication of inefficiency at all. In
fact the opposite is implied, with the positive relationship between wage
expenditure and league success being consistent with an ‘efficiency’
wage argument.17 A positive and significant correlation between the
16 The RESET test indicated that estimation 1.1(a) was correctly specified. However, with
the inclusion of club-specific fixed effects estimation 1.1(b) fails the RESET test at the 5
percent level of significance.
17 Inasmuch as the efficiency wage interpretation is correct then performance depends
directly on current wage expenditure, i.e., payment schemes are devised to give players
incentives to improve their performances.
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inefficiency terms from the stochastic wage and production functions
adds further support for this interpretation. There is therefore some
suggestion that higher wage costs can be taken to reflect aspects of
playing talent not measured by the available data (as implied in previous
research).
VI. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The behavioural equations (1)–(3) can be interpreted as implying that
there are feedback effects from current success on the field to future
sporting success. These feedback effects are assumed to work by clubs
ploughing back the revenue they earn from seasonal success into in-
vestments in playing skills, and these investments are in turn rewarded
by further success. The estimations reported here for the English PL
are consistent with such effects and, as such, and to the extent that
clubs invest a substantial proportion of their increased revenue in player
human capital, the investment policies of Premiership clubs generally
appear to be successful. Wages can be systematically related to specific
playing skills and the high wage strategies of some clubs can be linked
to greater success on the field. These results are also consistent with
cycles of relative success (and failure) in association football, where the
underlying mechanism involves the ability of more successful clubs to
invest in more human capital.
However, the implications of this for trends in competitive balance are
less clear since the parameters of the estimated equations suggest that,
after allowing for club-specific effects, club shares in league revenues are
a diminishing function of their shares of league points. In addition, while
constant costs in the production function and hedonic wage estimations
are not ruled out, league success appears to be a diminishing function of
wage expenditure. Therefore, even steep increases in wage expenditure
could result in only moderate improvements in the share of league
points won. On the other hand, the significance of club-specific effects
and participation in European competitions in the revenue function
implies that inequality of earnings is not simply a function of league
performance. Some clubs have access to resources that are a source of
sustained advantage, and as a consequence they are simply richer and
their scope for investing in player human capital is accordingly greater.
To summarize, success on the field can be systematically linked to
the skills and performance of players. Revenue is related positively to
(current and previous) success on the field, and over 60 percent of
revenue is spent on wages. Because wage bills systematically reflect
the skills and performances of players, increased investment in player-
related human capital buys success on the field (in the English PL
and in European competitions). Successful teams become ever richer
and are able to maintain or even build on their success by spending
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more on players than less successful clubs. To the extent that they are
successful in this objective there is a causal link between revenue earned
and competitive imbalance via investments in players. However, whether
sustained success leads to increases in competitive imbalance rather
than the maintenance of a status quo level of (im)balance remains to be
established, although the parameters of the model estimated here suggest
that the latter is more likely.
Our results for the PL may have wider implications relating to the
evolution of firm size and market structure. The analysis can be thought
of in terms of a field experiment (see Szymanski, 2001; or Kahn,
1993b) involving a market with a fixed number of ‘firms’ (although
market membership varies by regular entry to and exit from the PL).
In this view club shares in league points are analogous to market
shares or, equivalently, firm size. The data here indicate that there is no
automatic tendency for one firm (club) to become increasingly dominant,
depending on the parameters of the model, but more successful clubs
can remain so via a link between financial success and investment in
players, although success in this respect is not guaranteed (as with any
investment strategy). Nevertheless, by assuming that the number of firms
(clubs) remains fixed, with no exogenous influences (other than those
captured by the club-specific effects), the analysis ignores the possibility
of a step change in industry structure, e.g., due to technological change.
In relation to the English PL itself this omission is potentially serious.
For example, while exogenous injections of cash (through, for example,
ownership changes) into the dominant clubs can further cement compet-
itive imbalances such cash injections can also change the circumstances
of other clubs in the league dramatically. (In the latter context, and at
the time of writing, we await the outcome of recent developments at
Manchester City.)
The argument for maintaining competitive balance rests on the as-
sumption that there are diminishing returns to increased concentration
within a league.18 Clubs therefore need to exercise some self-restraint
in relation to their investments in player human capital. This would be
analogous to Nelson and Winter’s (1977) view regarding the investment
and output restraints exercised by firms that acquire substantial market
18 While Kesenne (2004) distinguishes between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ types of competitive
balance, Sanderson (2002) argues that competitive imbalance is an ‘inherent’ and ‘intractable’
part of all sporting competitions, and Zimbalist (2001) argues that competitive balance is
an ‘elusive’ goal as long as players and club owners fight over the spoils. In addition to the
specific references noted in fn. 4, there is an abundance of studies treating the measurement
of competitive balance and its implications in various sporting contexts, including Fort and
Quirk (1997, 2004), Horowitz (1997), Kesenne (2000, 2004), Szymanski (2001, 2003a,b,
2006c), Hill and Fort (2002), Humphreys (2002), Zimbalist (2002, 2003), Bougheas and
Downward (2003), Buzzachi et al. (2003), Fort and Maxcy (2003), Sanderson and Siegfried
(2003), Bourg (2004), Szymanski and Kesenne (2004), Larsen et al. (2006), Crooker and
Fenn (2007), Vrooman (2007).
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share, where a firm gaining a productivity advantage ‘will not exploit this
aggressively for fear of spoiling the market’ (Nelson and Winter, 1977,
p. 275). Thiswould apply to a self-contained sporting league,with a fixed
membership, whose general ‘health’ depends upon competitive balance
andwhere the existence and survival of an individual club depends on the
existence of others to compete with on a relatively equal basis.19 In such
a situation of competitive balance, each club should aspire to be better
than, but not that much better than, its rivals (Neale, 1964; El-Hodiri
and Quirk, 1971) in order to ensure an appropriate level of outcome
uncertainty in all its forms and at all levels, relating to individual match
outcomes, season/tournament outcomes, and the lack of persistent long-
run league domination by a single club or a small number of clubs.20 In
the case of the English PL together with those of similar top-tier national
leagues in Europe, however, the situation is rather different, in the sense
that it is not self-contained but rather a vehicle through which clubs
can secure participation in an additional, and more lucrative, continental
market. In this context, the more successful clubs want to ensure that the
gap between them and most, if not all, other clubs grows consistently
and ever larger.
There is increasing evidence that the financial implications of such
striving to maintain national market dominance, as well as simply
retaining a position within a top-tier league, are causing major problems
within the sport in England (Szymanski, 2006a) and throughout Europe
(Lago et al., 2006; Szymanski, 2006b).21 Vrooman (2007) describes
European football as being in a spiral of intra-league and inter-league
polarization of talent and wealth with many, even leading, clubs having
been driven to the edge of insolvency, and proposes a Super League
combining clubs from the leading European footballing nations as a
logical and necessary progression. To the extent that such a league would
be fixed in composition and ‘closed’ to entry with no opportunity for
advancement, the issue of equalization of team strengths would come
to the fore, with competitive balance of concern to individual clubs
as well as the league organization itself. However, this would arguably
require new, or reintroduced or reformulated, regulations and constraints
regarding matters such as salary caps, squad sizes, transfer markets and
19 The question as to whether it is an individual club/team or the entire league which
should be viewed as analogous to the firm has been the subject of a long standing debate in
the literature on the economics of sport. See, for example, Neale (1964), Demmert (1973),
together with Sloane’s (1971) seminal work on the football club as a utility maximizer and
various articles in Sloane (1997).
20 See Borland andMacdonald (2003) and Szymanski (2003a, b, 2006c) for recent reviews
of this literature.
21 The increasing prevalence of financial ‘distress’ in English football is also addressed by
Buraimo et al. (2006), amongst a symposium of articles published in the Journal of Sports
Economics (vol. 7, no. 1) examining the individual circumstances of eight national leagues
in Europe.
C© 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
MAINTAINING MARKET POSITION IN THE PREMIER LEAGUE 29
playermobility, whichEurope’smajor leagues have either relinquished or
rejected and which are currently viewed as ‘anathema’ by the continent’s
leading clubs.
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APPENDIX
Definitions of variables
Variable Definition
POINTS Points won
POINTSH% Points won in current season as a percentage share of
total points won by all clubs in current season
PREVPNTSH% Points won in previous season as a percentage share of
total points won by all clubs in previous season
PNTS%MAX Points won in current season as a percentage of total
maximum points attainable
PROM Dummy variable indicating a promoted club
GOALS Goals scored
GOALSCON Goals conceded
GOALDIF Goal difference
SHOTS Total shot attempts on goal (shots off and on target)
CONATTACK/SHOTS Ratio of the sum of goals scored, assists and shots on
target (highly constructive plays) to total shots
SHOTSTAR Total shots on target
ASSISTS Passes leading directly to a goal (goal assists)
CROSSES Total crosses made
CROSSCOMP Total crosses completed (received by own team player)
PSCOMP Total passes completed (received by own team player)
DRBRUNS Total dribbles and runs
DRBRUNCOMP Total dribbles and runs completed (received by own
team player prior to pass, cross or shot)
TACKLES Total tackles made
TACKLESWON Total tackles won
BLKCLRINT Total blocks, clearances and interceptions
YELLOW Yellow cards received for infringements
RED Red cards received for infringements/indiscipline
FOULS Total fouls committed (conceded)
(Continued)
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APPENDIX
Continued
Variable Definition
OPPSHOTS Total shots on goal by opposition teams
GLCON/SAVES Ratio of goals conceded to goalkeeper saves
SAVES Total saves made by goalkeeper
HOME Ratio of points won at home to points won away (in
season)
CHMAN Dummy variable indicating a change in manager in close
season or during season
CHAMPIONSL Club competed in UEFA Champions League in current
season
UEFACUP Club competed in UEFA Cup in current season
MANYRS Number of years manager with club at start of season
REV Total annual revenue (turnover)
REVSH% Revenue as a percentage share of total revenue earned by
all clubs in season
WAGE Annual expenditure on wages and salaries
WAGESH% Annual expenditure on wages and salaries as a percentage
share of total wages and salary expenditure by all clubs
in season
TRAN Annual net receipts from transfers (purchases recorded as
negative value)
TRANSH% Net receipts from transfers as a percentage share of total
net transfer spending (sample minimum value of
TRANS added to all values)
LnWAGESH% ∗ INEFF LnWAGESH% multiplied by the inefficiency term (ui)
from stochastic cost frontier estimation of the hedonic
wage
Notes: 1. In the reported results the prefix  indicates the variable is the difference between
the value of the variable in t and its value in t−1. The prefix Ln indicates that a variable is the
natural log of the original variable; the prefix Ln indicates that a variable is the natural log
of the value of the variable in t divided by the value of the variable in t−1.
2. The previous points’ totals of promoted clubs were set equal to the average points won by
the bottom placed (and relegated) clubs in the PL over the period (27.429).
3. Data relating to playing performance are sourced from OPTA and Actim (PA Sports,
2007). SHOTS is the sum of shots on target and shots off target. CONATTACK/SHOTS is
constructed from the total figures for goals scored, goal assists, shots on target and total shots.
GLCON/SAVES is the total number of goals conceded divided by the number of goalkeeper
saves. The number of completed passes, dribbles and runs and tackles is reported directly
in the Actim data and constructed from reported totals and reported completion rates in the
OPTA data. All other performance variables are as reported in OPTA and Actim.
4. Data relating to revenue, wages and transfer receipts were sourced from Deloitte (2000)–
(2007). As far as possible, the data used were those most recently reported. At the time of
writing these data remained incomplete for Bradford (1997–8 wage and transfer data) and
Middlesbrough (2004–5 transfer data only). The data are reported as presented in Deloitte
(2000)–(2007) including three observations that were reported for only 11 month accounting
periods.
5. Data relating to league points and positions, European competitions and management
experience and changes were obtained from various editions of the Rothmans Football
Yearbooks and Sky Football Year Books.
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